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Abstract 
 L’articolo indaga i temi dell’accertamento del rapporto causale nelle fattispecie di 
mesotelioma che sono la conseguenza di esposizioni negligenti alle polveri d’amianto nella 
responsabilità civile Italiana e quello della relazione tra accertamento giudiziale e parere 
dell’esperto scientifico 
 
 
  This paper investigates, firstly, the issue of ascertainment of causal link in 
mesothelioma cases, consequent to negligent exposure to asbestos dust, in Italian tort law: 
unlike  English courts, Italian courts have never developed a special test for 
ascertainment of causation in mesothelioma cases. Secondly, the relationship between 
judicial ascertainment and expert opinion is analysed: the complexity of the modern 
world increasingly requires judges to draw on science when evaluating judicial cases 
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THE SIENKIEWICZ CASE AND THE PROBLEMS 
RELATED TO CAUSATION IN MESOTHELIOMA 
CASES IN THE ITALIAN COURTS 
NADIA COGGIOLA 
 
1. Problems arising out of the establishment of causation in mesothelioma cases 
of negligent exposure to limited amounts of asbestos dust - 2. The issue of the 
ascertainment of causation in mesothelioma cases in Italian case-law - 3. The 
issue of the relationship between scientific theories and judicial reasoning in 
Italian case-law - 4. Conclusion 
 
Problems arising out of the establishment of causation in mesothelioma 
cases of negligent exposure to limited amounts of asbestos dust 
Although mesothelioma is considered a “signature disease”, because it is 
generally the consequence of asbestos exposure, the ascertainment of the 
causal link between the exposure and the occurrence of this illness is often 
made difficult by the lack of scientific certainty on its aetiology. 
In fact, while what is generally called the “single fibre theory” affirms 
that mesothelioma is triggered by a single asbestos fibre, and that therefore 
subsequent exposures to the same noxious agent have no causative effect on 
the development of the illness, the so called “multi-fibre theory” holds that all 
or a set of asbestos fibres in the lungs jointly ingenerate chemicals mutations 
that initiate the onset of the disease. 
Where the first scientific theory is applied, the petitioner must prove that 
the defendant exposed the victim to the fibre that caused the mesothelioma 
set off, while the adoption of the second theory entails that the same 
petitioner demonstrates that the defendant contributed to the exposure that 
caused the pathology. 
Therefore, the choice of one of the two theories requires the application 
of a different legal rule of ascertainment of the causation. This choice is always 
an unenviable task for the judge because, although the reliability of the “single 
fibre theory” has perhaps lately diminished, mainly due to recent researches1, 
both theories are acknowledged by the scientific community. 
                                                          
 Dr. Nadia Coggiola, Università di Torino, email: nadia.coggiola@unito.it 
1 See for example C. GILHAM, J. HATCH, J. PETO, C. RAKE,  Occupational, 
Domestic and Environmental Mesothelioma risks in Britain, Health and Safety Executive, in  
British Journal of Cancer (2009) 100, p 1175 – 1183, online in http://www.hse.gov.uk/ 
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Moreover, if the traditional but for test were applied in those cases, it 
would be generally very difficult or even impossible for the petitioners to 
prove that the exposure of the negligent defendants caused the mesothelioma. 
The House of Lords faced these problems in the well known Fairchild 
case2, where the petitioners, exposed to asbestos fibres by several different 
negligent employers, were not able to demonstrate, on the balance of 
probability, which of them caused the mesothelioma. In that occasion, 
following McGhee v. National Coal Board3, the House of Lords held the joint and 
several liability of the defendants that had materially increased the risk of harm 
of the plaintiffs, violating their duties to protect them against that very harm. 
This rule, to some extend later confirmed by the same Court in Barker v 
Corus UK Ltd 4, was then finally enacted by the Parliament in its current form 
in the Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006. That Section states that when 
a victim contracts mesothelioma each person who has, in breach of duty, been 
responsible for exposing the victim to a significant quantity of asbestos dust 
and thus for creating a “material increase in risk” of the victim contracting the 
disease will be held jointly and severally liable for causing the disease. 
Nevertheless, this prescription was not able to settle all the problems 
concerning the ascertainment of the causal link in mesothelioma cases. It was 
for example not clear if the so called “Fairchild rule” had to be applied in cases 
where the defendant was only responsible for a limited amount of the 
exposure, and the main exposure to asbestos fibers was environmental or 
from other legal sources. 
Two cases concerning that issue were lately discussed in front of the 
Supreme Court in the Sienkiewicz case. In both cases the sole defendant caused 
a negligent exposure to asbestos of limited amount, especially if compared to 
the environmental exposure of the victims. 
The Supreme Court excluded the application of the conventional 
causation test of the balance of probability to mesothelioma cases, and held 
the liability of the defendants, affirming that also in those cases the Section 3 
of the Compensation Act applies. 
Before investigating the attitude of Italian Courts when confronted to 
similar cases, I would like to point out the attention of the readers to some 
                                                          
research /rrhtm/rr696.htm, cited by the same Lord Phillips in the Sienkiewicz case, 
para 18. The Report suggests the possibility of a synergistic interaction between early 
and later exposures and therefore the cumulative effect of later exposure 
contributing to causation initiated by an earlier exposure. 
2 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32 
3 McGhee v. National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 
4 Barker v. Corus plc and others [2006] UKHL 20; 2006 WL 1078944; (2006) 103(20) 
L.S.G. 27; (2006) 156 N.L.J. 796; [2006] N.P.C. 50; The Times, May 4, 2006; 2006 
WL 1078944 
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question raised in the Sienkiewicz decision that could also be relevant in the 
Italian system. 
The first problem is that of the limits of the reliability and adequacy of 
epidemiological evidence in cases of mesothelioma. 
This issue was pointed out by Lord Phillips, that underlined the difficulty 
in collating sound epidemiological data and of obtaining reliable evidence as to 
the relevant experience of the victim, and the uncertainty as to the adequacy of 
the epidemiological evidence that is available as a guide to causation 5. 
In his opinion, the adoption of the special rule of causation applied in 
Fairchild and Barker is justified by the cumulative effect of subsequent, 
different exposures and by the current scientific knowledge. Therefore, where 
there is no known lower threshold of the exposure that is capable of causing 
mesothelioma, also a very low level of asbestos exposure must be deemed 
sufficient to cause the disease, unless that same exposure is insignificant 
compared to the exposure from other sources 6. 
The second issue is that of the proof of the essential elements. 
As Lord Rodger remembers, the Fairchild exception constitutes a balance 
between the interests of claimants and defendants in the difficult 
mesothelioma cases. Consequently, judges must take a rigorous approach to 
the proof of the essential elements7. Opinion openly shared by Lady Hale8. 
The third and last issue is that of the consequences of the application of 
the Fairchild exception in mesothelioma cases. 
The problem is pointed out by Lord Brown, which underlines the unjust 
results that the application of a rule different from the but for test to 
mesothelioma cases brings about and therefore calls for a reversal of the 
Fairchild principle, allowing no exception whatever to the normal rule of 
causation9. 
My investigation of the Italian case-law concerning mesothelioma will, as 
much as possible, concentrate on these isssues. 
 
The issue of the ascertainment of causation in mesothelioma cases in 
Italian case-law 
The Italian general rule in civil liability provides that the defendant can 
be held liable for damage when the existence of a link of causation between 
the action of the defendant and the harm can be proved, and that the onus of 
that proof lies with the petitioner. 
The test commonly used to ascertain the existence of a causal link is the 
conditio sine qua non test, essentially equivalent to the English but for test, or alike 
                                                          
5 Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Limited [2011] UKSC 10, paras 98 and ff. 
6 Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Limited [2011] UKSC 10, paras 103-111. 
7 Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Limited [2011] UKSC 10, para 166 
8 Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Limited [2011] UKSC 10, para 173 
9 Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Limited [2011] UKSC 10, para 174-187 
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tests based on the finding of the sole element that caused the damage. 
Therefore the Italian general system of civil liability does not actually differ 
from the English traditional one. 
Differently from English courts, Italian courts never developed a special 
test for the ascertainment of the causation in mesothelioma cases. 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Italian decisions concerning 
mesothelioma cases are often the outcome of the application of criteria based 
more on ‘intra-case’ considerations than on general principles of law, and 
those same decisions can be quite inconsistent with each other. 
The criteria used by Italian civil courts to ascertain the liability of the 
defendant can be roughly divided into three main categories. 
Liability can be found excluding the possibility that the mesothelioma 
could be caused by another factor, especially in cases where the only known 
poisonous exposure was that caused by the defendant10. 
Or, when it could not be excluded with certainty the existence of other 
possible causes of the disease, different from the exposure caused by the 
defendant, the judge can held the defendant liable because he believes there is 
a high probability that his negligent exposure was the cause of the 
mesothelioma.11 
Lastly, the Corte di Cassazione affirmed in two occasions that the 
defendant is to be held liable when he failed to provide security measures 
sufficient to reduce the risk of the occurrence of the mesothelioma.12 In both 
occasions it stated that the ascertainment of the causation link between the 
working exposure and the cancer occurrence must be examined on the basis 
of the measures of reduction of the risk that the defendant provided. 
This rule was also later applied by the same Court in a case of cancer of 
the lungs, which could have been caused by different pathogenic factors, and 
occurred in a smoker13. 
                                                          
10 As in, for example, Trib. Venezia, 21 maggio 2003, n° 1791, unpublished 
11 Read, for example, Trib. Trieste, 25 febbraio 2004, n. 103, in Giur. it. 
(Giurisprudenza Italiana), 2005, p 497, with note by N. COGGIOLA, "L’esposizione 
alle polveri d’amianto ed il nesso di causalità di fronte al giudice civile" 
12 Cass., sez. lav., 9 maggio 1998, n. 4721 in Giust. civ. (Giustizia civile), 1999, I, p 539 
ed in Foro it. Rep (Repertorio del Foro Italiano)., 1999, voce Lavoro (rapporto), n. 1448 and 
Cass., sez. lav., 23 maggio 2003, n. 8204, in Foro it., Rep., 2003, voce Infortuni sul lavoro, 
n. 1358 , Mass. Giust. Civ. (Massimario Giustizia civile), 2003, e Cass., sez. lav., 9 maggio 
1998, n. 4721,  Giust. civ., 1999, I, 593 and in Foro it, Rep., 1999, voce Lavoro (rapporto), 
n. 1448. 
13 Cass. Sez. Lav., 13 dicembre 2004, n° 644, in Giur. It., 2005, p 1390, with note by 
N. COGGIOLA, "Il risarcimento dei danni da esposizione ad amianto: dall’utilizzo 
del concetto dell’aumento del rischio all’inversione dell’onere della prova sul nesso di 
causalità" 
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The principle on which this principle is based is the criterion of the 
probabilistic possibility of a relationship between the action or omission of the 
defendant and either the increase or reduction of the risk of the harm. 
It is important to point out to the readers that the diversity of the rules 
applied by Italian civil courts in the ascertainment of the causation generates 
uncertainties in the protection of the rights of those suffering from 
mesothelioma because of asbestos exposure, providing a reason for the 
harmed party to seek protection in the often more comfortable criminal 
procedure. 
Similar but specular problems are faced by the defendants and their 
insurers that, because of the uncertainties on the causation criteria, are unable 
to predict the outcome of the civil proceedings, and consequently the measure 
of their future financial obligations.14 
 
The issue of the relationship between scientific theories and judicial 
reasoning in Italian case-law 
The issue of the limits of the relationship between scientific theories and 
judicial reasoning has recently been debated by the Italian criminal section of 
the Corte di Cassazione. 
The case concerned a criminal proceeding against 14 managers and 
directors of a large  company, for the non malicious death of some workers, 
caused by asbestosis or mesothelioma, and a civil proceeding against the same 
company for the compensation of the damage. 
The court of first instance condemned the accused only for the deaths 
caused by the asbestosis, while excluded their liability for those caused by the 
mesothelioma. In its opinion it was in fact impossible to ascertain if the fibres 
inhaled by the workers that caused or aggravated the mesotheliomas were 
attributable to the accused and there was no scientific certainty on the 
reliability of the multi-fibre theory.15 
The Corte di Appello of Torino reversed this latter decision, and 
therefore condemned the managers and directors of the company also for the 
deaths caused by the mesothelioma16. 
The scientific expert appointed by the Court had in fact affirmed that the 
mesothelioma is notoriously an illness caused by the asbestos exposure, and 
that all the dead workers had been professionally exposed to asbestos fibres in 
the factory. 
On the basis of this scientific opinion, the Corte di Appello decided to 
adhere to the multi-fibre theory in the ascertainment of the causation. In its 
                                                          
14 For further information in English on the issue of mesothelioma cases in the 
Italian civil courts please read N. COGGIOLA, Asbestos Cases in the Italian Courts: 
Duelling with Uncertainty, in InDret, 2009, p 1 
15 Tribunale di Verbania, 1° giugno 2007, unpublished 
16 Corte di Appello of Torino, 25 march 2009, unpublished 
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consideration, due to the prolonged exposure of the workers to asbestos dust 
and their poor working conditions, the application of this test to the case 
could be excluded only if it were proved that the mesothelioma was the 
consequence of the first asbestos exposure. 
Moreover, the same Court affirmed that, besides, the same extended 
exposure had augment the risk to develop the mesothelioma, and therefore 
could be regarded as a concurrent cause of the deaths. 
In the own words of the Corte d’Appello, this judgment on the causation 
was not the consequence of a scientific assessment, but more plainly the result 
of its reasonable adherence to a scientific theory. 
The condemned appealed against this sentence to the Forth Criminal 
Section of the Corte di Cassazione, which investigated in its sentence n° 38991 
of the 4th November 2010 the problem of the ascertainment of causation in 
cases of scientific uncertainty.17 
In its opinion the Court acknowledged that the judge must avail himself 
of scientific criteria when he is asked to ascertain the causation in cases in 
which the injury was the consequence of an omission of the accused. These 
scientific criteria can be distinguished in “general rules” and “statistical rules”: 
the first apply to every situation, without exceptions, while the latter only 
establish the existence of a causal relationship in a percentage of situations.  
Nevertheless, the same Court of Cassazione also reminded that those 
scientific criteria must be coupled with the “logical probability” that, in the 
case under discussion, the damage was the consequence of a certain action or 
omission. 
Therefore, causation can be held in cases of low statistical probability, 
when other causal factors can be excluded, and can be instead denied in cases 
where the statistical probability is very high. 
In the opinion of the Cassazione where, as in the case under 
examination, there exist two contrasting scientific theories on the link of 
causation (the “multi-fibre theory” and the “single fibre theory”) the judge 
must exclude the existence of other possible alternative causes of the damage, 
different from the cause under investigation and verify the reliability of the 
scientific theory to be applied in the case.  
Scientific theories, in fact, are to be deemed as mere instruments to 
prove the facts. 
Consequently, when faced with contrasting scientific theories, the judge 
must explain in his reasoning the motives of his decision in favour of the 
application of one scientific theory, on the basis of the following parameters: 
the epistemological reasoning must be the outcome of the dialectic of the 
                                                          
17 Cass., Sez. IV, n° 38991, 10th June 2010, in Resp. Civ. Prev. (Responsabilità civile e 
previdenza) 2011, 2, 346, with note by  N. COGGIOLA, “La Cassazione penale ed il 
problema della scelta delle teorie scientifiche secondo cui ricostruire la causalità nelle 
fattispecie di mesoteliomi causati dall’esposizione all’amianto” 
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different opinions; the judge doesn’t creates the rules, but simply discovers 
them; the ascertainment of causation must be without any reasonable doubt. 
The decision of the Corte di Cassazione clearly sets forth three clear 
principles concerning the relationship between the scientific expert opinion 
and the judge assessment in the ascertainment of causation. 
Firstly, the judge must critically evaluate scientific opinions, and not 
passively adhere to them. 
Secondly, the judge’s duty is to apply the scientific rules, not to work 
them out. 
Finally, there must be no reasonable doubt in the ascertainment of the 
causation based on a scientific theory. 
Due to the complexity of the task, the judge must therefore clearly 
explain his choices, when these are based on scientific theories not 
acknowledged by the entire scientific community. 
Certainly, this sentence of the Corte di Cassazione is a further step in the 
development of Italian case law on the issue of the relationship between the 
judicial evaluation and the use of scientific proof, after the notorious decision 
Franzese, of the Criminal Joint Sections of the Corte di Cassazione. 18 
In those case the Court held that to ascertain the causation in cases of 
medical malpractice in which the damage is the consequence of an omission 
the judge must evaluate not only the “statistical probability”, but also the 
“logical probability”. This latter is based on an inductive reasoning, and takes 
into consideration the feasibility of the use of the statistical law in the actual 
case under examination and the rationality of the judicial assessment. 
That rule was later used by the same Corte di Cassazione in later criminal 
sentences concerning mesothelioma cases.19 
                                                          
18 Cass., SS.UU., 10 luglio 2002, n. 30328, Franzese, in Foro it. (Foro Italiano), 2002, II, p 
601, with note by O. DI GIOVINE, "La causalità omissiva in campo medico-
chirurgico al vaglio delle sezioni unite"; in Dir. e giust. (Diritto e giustizia), 2002, p 21, 
with note by V. PEZZELLA; in Danno e resp. (Danno e responsabilità), 2003, p 195, with 
note by S. CACACE, "L'omissione del medico e il rispetto della presunzione 
d'innocenza nell'accertamento del nesso causale" 
19 Cass., sez. IV, 11 luglio 2002, n° 953, Macola, in Foro it., 2003, II, p 324, with note 
by R. GUARINIELLO, “Tumori professionali da amianto e responsabilità penale”; 
Cass., sez IV, 9 maggio 2003, in Foro it., 2004, II, 69, with note by  R. 
GUARINIELLO, “Tumori professionali da legno e amianto”; Cass., sez. IV, 
1°marzo 2005, n° 7630, Marchiorello, in Dir. prat .lav. (Diritto e pratica del lavoro) 2005, p 
1513, with note by R GUARINIELLO, “Tumori da amianto e nesso causale”, in 
Igiene sic. lav. (Igiene e sicurezza del lavoro), 2005, 350; Cass., sez. IV, 12 luglio 2005, n° 
39393, Chivilò, in Dir. prat .lav., 2006, p 245, with note by R. GUARINIELLO, 
“Tumori da amianto e rapporto causale” 
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Conclusion 
The complexity of the modern world increasingly requires that judges 
employ scientific theories in the evaluation of judicial cases. Therefore, both 
Italian and foreign courts are often compelled to confront with scientific 
issues, as in cases of mesothelioma damage. 
Furthermore, as science has become an highly specialized discipline, 
intelligible by a few experts of the field, judges are frequently obliged to ask 
for expert scientific opinions and explanations. In these cases there is the 
concrete risk that the judge reasoning is the product of his uncritical adoption 
of the scientific theory, rather then the autonomous judicial decision it should 
be. 
The opinion of the Italian criminal branch of the Corte di Cassazione on 
the issue is that judges cannot elaborate scientific theories but at the same time 
they must critically evaluate the opinion of the experts. 
Finally, it must be underlined that the civil branch of the same Corte di 
Cassazione has not yet pronounced on the same problem, and it is not 
improbable that the issue will not be debated by that Court for a long time. 
Traditionally, in fact, the civil branch of the Corte di Cassazione is 
generally reluctant to deal with the issue of the cause-in-fact test to be applied 
in the decisions, because in its opinion such an investigation, concerning the 
mere facts of the case, lies within the exclusive competence of the lower 
courts and should not be criticized by the Cassazione, as long as the lower 
court judges reasoning is clearly articulated.20 
Only lately this attitude was partly reversed, in cases concerning damages 
arising out of infected blood transfusions and blood products, decided by the 
civil Joint Sections of the Corte di Cassazione on 11 January 2008,21 and in 
cases of medical malpractice.22 
                                                          
20 See Corte Cass., sez. III, 16 maggio 2003, n. 7637, in Giust. civ. Mass. 2003, f. 5; 
Corte Cass., sez. III, 11 marzo 2002, n. 3492, in Giust. civ. Mass. 2002, p 435; Corte 
Cass., sez. III, 29 aprile 1996, n. 3939, in Giust. civ. Mass. 1996, p 642; Corte Cass. sez. 
III, 6 agosto 1987, n. 6759, in Rass. avv. Stato 1987, I, p 343; Corte Cass., sez. lav., 17 
novembre 1984, n. 5882, in Giust. civ. Mass. 1984, fasc. 11; Corte Cass., sez. III, 28 
febbraio 1983, n. 1504 in Giust. civ. Mass. 1983, fasc. 2; Corte Cass., sez. III, 15 marzo 
1980, n. 1748, in Arch. civ. 1980, p 670; Corte Cass., sez. lav., 5 luglio 1979, n. 3861, in 
Giust. civ. Mass. 1979, fasc. 7 
21 Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, cases from 576 a 585. Those cases were largely 
published and commented, see among others Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 576, 
in Foro amm.-Cons. Stato (Foro Amministrativo-Consiglio di Stato), 2008, p 76; Cass. 
SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 577, in Foro it., 2008, I, p 455, with note by A. 
PALMIERI, Giur. it., 2008, p 1653, with note by A. CIATTI, "Crepuscolo della 
distinzione tra le obbligazioni di mezzi e le obbligazioni di risultato; La responsabilità 
civile", 2008, p 397, with note by R. CALVO, "Diritti del paziente, onus probandi e 
responsabilità della struttura sanitaria"; Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 580, Giur. 
it., 2008, p 1646, with note by P. VALORE, "Danno da emotrasfusione e decorrenza 
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In all these decisions the Court clearly stated that the investigation of 
causation in civil cases follows paths and rules that are different from those of 
criminal cases. From that assertion it could be inferred that the Franzese 
principles, are no longer applicable in civil cases. Therefore it could be 
deduced that also the latter decision of the criminal branch of the Corte di 
Cassazione will most probably have no influence on the rules governing the 
ascertainment of causation in civil mesothelioma cases.23 
del termine di prescrizione"; Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 581, in Foro it., 2008, 
I, p 453, with note by A. PALMIERI, Resp. Civ. Prev., 2008, p 827, with note by F. 
GRECO, "Le sezioni unite ed il limite prescrizionale nel danno da emotrasfusioni 
infette"; Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 582, in Foro it., 2008, I, p 453, with note 
by A. PALMIERI; Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 583, in Giur. it., 2008, p 1695 
(m), with note by G. TERLIZZI, "Il dies a quo della prescrizione tra tutela del 
danneggiato e certezza del diritto"; Cass. SS.UU., 11 gennaio 2008, n. 584, in Foro it., 
2008, I, p 451, with note by A. PALMIERI 
22 Cass., III° Sez., 16 ottobre 2007, n° 21.619, in Danno e resp., 2008, p 43, with 
comment by R. PUCELLA; Corr. giur., 2008, 1, p 35, with note by M BONA, 
"Causalità civile: il decalogo della Cassazione a due "dimensioni di analisi"", affirming 
that the different approach is evident even with regards to the probation issue 
23 Some interesting comments on the issue of causation in Italian civil courts can be 
found in A. BELVEDERE, “Causalità giuridica?”, in Riv. dir. civ. (Rivista di diritto 
civile), 2007, I, p 7; M. CAPECCHI, “La causalità materiale e il concorso di cause”, in 
I Fatti illeciti. III. Causalità e danno, (ed.) G. VISINTINI, Padova, 1999, 38; M. 
CAPUTI, “Il nesso di causalità nella responsabilità civile:un problema irrisolto o 
sopravvalutato?”, in Riv. crit. dir. priv. (Rivista critica di diritto privato), 2007, 169 
